On June 1, the Northern District of California dismissed a putative TCPA class action against AOL, finding that the plaintiff had failed to allege that AOL utilized an automated telephone dialing system (ATDS), as required to state a cause of action under the TCPA. In dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint in Derby v. AOL, the court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that AOL Instant Messenger (AIM), which allows individuals to send instant messages as text messages to cell phones, constitutes an ATDS. Instead, the court agreed with AOL’s argument that AIM relied on “human intervention” to send the messages at issue, which foreclosed the possibility of potential TCPA liability. (Covington represented AOL in this case.) The decision should be beneficial to a variety of services that enable their users to send text messages to cell phones.
The TCPA’s prohibitions include a ban on using an ATDS to call cellular telephones for informational purposes without the prior express consent of the recipient. The FCC and courts have extended the reach of the statute to include text messages. However, the FCC has stated that only equipment that has the capacity to operate “without human intervention” may qualify as an ATDS. The plaintiff in Derby alleged that he received three text messages from an AIM user that were intended for another individual, which the court recognized were “presumably . . . the result of the sender inputting an incorrect phone number.” After the receiving the third message, the plaintiff alleged that he sent a text message to AIM to block future texts from the AIM user, and that he received back a text confirmation of his request.
In analyzing TCPA liability for the first three text messages, the court noted that the plaintiff’s complaint “affirmatively alleges that AIM relies on human intervention to transmit text messages to recipients’ cell phones.” The court followed precedent from other Ninth Circuit district courts rejecting ATDS arguments where the equipment at issue relied on humans to press buttons on phones or manually enter telephone numbers into the system. Since the complaint demonstrated that “extensive human intervention is required to send text messages through defendant’s AIM service,” the court held that the complaint failed to state a claim under the TCPA with respect to the three text messages sent by an AIM user.
The court also analyzed potential TCPA liability for the separate confirmation text message that Derby alleged he had received from AIM. Again citing relevant authority, the court held that “a single message sent in response to plaintiff’s text . . . is not the kind of intrusive, nuisance call that the TCPA prohibits.” The court concluded that Derby, having sent the “block” request from his cell phone, had “knowingly released” his number to AIM and consented to receive a confirmation text from AIM at that number. The court’s opinion advocated for a “common sense” approach to TCPA liability, finding that the statute should not be utilized to “punish the consumer-friendly practice of confirming requests to block future unwanted texts.” Accordingly, the court also dismissed the TCPA claim based on the confirmation text message for failure to state a claim.