In a unanimous ruling, the D.C. Circuit shed new light this week on the applicability of key federal criminal statutes on proceedings before the Office of Congressional Ethics (“OCE”). While largely removing the prospect of criminal obstruction liability for parties responding to inquiries from OCE, the court’s opinion is another reminder of the potentially serious collateral consequences inherent in any congressional investigation.
The case, United States v. Bowser, arose out of an OCE investigation of a senior aide to former Congressman Paul Broun. OCE is an independent, non-partisan entity that was established by a House Resolution in 2008. While OCE is tasked with investigating alleged violations of any “law, rule, regulation, or other standard of conduct” committed by a “Member, officer, or employee of the House,” its powers are limited. For example, OCE cannot issue subpoenas or compel cooperation with its investigations. Participating in an OCE investigation in voluntary—though, the OCE often threatens to embarrass witnesses by declaring them to be uncooperative in public documents and drawing an “adverse inference” from any unwillingness to cooperate. Further, OCE is not authorized to formally determine whether such a violation occurred or otherwise take action to sanction Members or staff under investigation. Rather, OCE is intended to serve as a fact-finding body, with the Office ultimately responsible for determining whether there is “substantial reason” to believe that a violation has occurred and, upon making such a determination, referring matters to the House Ethics Committee for further review.
In Bowser, the former aide was accused of using official funds to hire an outside consultant to assist his boss in preparing for debates and other campaign appearances. The ensuing OCE investigation ultimately led to an Ethics Committee probe and, as relevant here, the federal prosecution of the aide. Importantly, the aide was charged with not only violating the prohibition on the use of official funds for political activity, but also multiple crimes stemming from his efforts to thwart OCE’s initial investigation. In particular, after voluntarily complying with a request for documents, the aide signed two documents certifying that he had complied fully with the request and acknowledging that this certification was subject to the False Statements Act.
Following a trial, the aide was convicted of obstructing Congress, as well as concealing material facts from and making false statements to OCE during the course of its investigation. After the district court granted the aide’s request to dismiss the obstruction charge, the aide appealed his remaining convictions on the grounds that the federal statutes under which he was charged did not apply to his interactions with OCE.
In upholding some—but not all—of the aide’s convictions, the D.C. Circuit drew an important distinction between the federal obstruction-of-Congress statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1505 and the more familiar False Statements Act set out at 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Specifically, the Court noted that the obstruction statute criminalizes only the obstruction of an “inquiry or investigation [that] is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress.” By contrast, the False Statements Act applies to “any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress.” Reasoning that OCE was merely an office of Congress—and not a committee of Congress—the court concluded that the obstruction statute does not apply to investigations conducted by OCE. The court thus affirmed the dismissal of the obstruction charge. At the same time, however, the court upheld the aide’s false-statements convictions on the grounds that he had fair notice of the applicability of § 1001 to his certification that his response was complete.
Although Bowser largely alleviates the risk of an obstruction charge for parties investigated by OCE, the court’s decision leaves some questions unresolved. Most notably, the court left open the possibility that a “legislative office might work so closely with the House or a [House] committee that the investigation” could be covered by the obstruction statute. Further, because the court’s decision focused on the application of the obstruction statute to OCE, the court did not directly address whether prosecutors may bring an obstruction charge in connection with an inquiry from an individual Member or group of Members. These open questions notwithstanding, the decision is a stark reminder of the potential risks associated with any congressional investigation.