In Lackey v. Stinnie, the Supreme Court has clarified who qualifies as a “prevailing party” eligible for attorneys’ fees under certain statutes. The decision carries significant implications for the availability of attorneys’ fees in class action cases where defendants are able to moot claims before a court enters a final judgment.
At issue in Lackey was whether plaintiffs could obtain attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988(b), which allows the “prevailing party” to recover attorneys’ fees in certain civil rights cases. Plaintiffs secured a preliminary injunction but were not able to obtain any further relief (including a final judgment) because the government voluntarily ceased the challenged conduct. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not qualify as a “prevailing party.”
Lackey arose from a putative class action challenging the constitutionality of a Virginia law that suspended the driver’s licenses of Virginians with unpaid court fines. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the putative class of drivers had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and risk of irreparable harm. However, before class certification or trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the challenged law and reinstated all affected licenses, mooting plaintiffs’ claims. The drivers nonetheless sought attorneys’ fees based on the district court’s prior grant of the preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorneys’ fees because “preliminary injunctions do not conclusively resolve the rights of parties on the merits” and therefore “do not confer prevailing party status.” Plaintiffs’ claims were resolved by the Virginia legislature’s repeal of the law—not through a victory in court. The Court reasoned that “external events that render a dispute moot do not convert a temporary order designed to preserve the status of the parties into a conclusive adjudication of their rights.” In dissent, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson argued that the decision was contrary to Congress’s intent to encourage attorneys to file civil rights actions.
The Court’s decision may alter incentives in some class actions brought under statutes authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties. Defendants may have greater interest in voluntarily ceasing challenged conduct rather than risking large attorneys’ fees awards. In turn, plaintiffs may be more motivated to pursue damages in addition to injunctive relief in order to enhance their chances of recovering fees. The Court, however, reasoned that situations where government defendants might “strategically moot litigation rather than risk a fee award” would arise “only in a small number of contexts” where plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief and it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur.”
Although this decision clarifies the definition of “prevailing party” for certain types of civil rights actions, it will not automatically apply to all fee-shifting statutes, especially those under state laws that have established a more liberal interpretation of “prevailing party.” However, the Court’s reasoning is likely to have at least persuasive power in analogous situations under other statutes where there is no clear legislative intent favoring a different interpretation.