The Northern District of California denied class certification in a data breach suit against Zoosk, an online dating service, concluding that the lead plaintiff had waived any right to represent a class by agreeing to a class-action waiver.  See Order Denying Class Certification, Flores-Mendez v. Zoosk, Inc., No. 3:20-04929-WHA (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2022).

On August 1, 2022, the CJEU issued its ruling in Case 184/20 (OT v Vyriausioji tarnybinės etikos komisija) following a referral from the Lithuanian Regional Administrative Court. In this ruling, the CJEU elected to interpret the GDPR very broadly in a judgment that is likely to have a significant impact for organisations processing

The UK Government recently published its AI Governance and Regulation: Policy Statement (the “AI Statement”) setting out its proposed approach to regulating Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) in the UK. The AI Statement was published alongside the draft Data Protection and Digital Information Bill (see our blog post here for further details on the Bill) and is

In Drazen v. Pinto, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a class settlement and held that in order to receive individual damages (whether through a settlement or otherwise), all class members must have Article III standing under Circuit precedent.  2022 WL 2963470, at *6 (11th Cir. July 27, 2022).  The decision gives defendants another tool to defeat class certification, while at the same time makes it more difficult to include class members that lack standing in classwide settlements. 

On August 9, 2022, President Biden signed into law the CHIPS and Science Act—a massive, $280 billion bill to boost public and private sector investments in critical and emerging technologies.

We anticipate significant opportunities and an evolving regulatory landscape for companies, associations, universities, and others who work in various technology sectors, including:

  • High performance computing, semiconductors, and advanced computer hardware/software
  • Advanced communications technology and immersive technology
  • Advanced energy and industrial efficiency technology (including batteries, nuclear)
  • Advanced materials science (including composites 2D and next-generation materials)
  • Artificial intelligence, machine learning, autonomy, and related advances
  • Quantum information science and technology
  • Biotechnology, medical technology, genomics, and synthetic biology
  • Data storage/management, distributed ledgers, and cybersecurity (including biometrics)
  • Natural and anthropogenic disaster prevention or mitigation
  • Robotics, automation, and advanced manufacturing

Below is an overview of the legislation and the funding and tax credit opportunities it provides for entities that participate in the research, development, production, education, or transfer of critical and emerging technologies, especially semiconductor manufacturing and research and open-RAN technology.

Overview

Headlining the bill are $54 billion in appropriations to fund the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (“CHIPS”) for America Act, which was authorized in 2021. The bill also includes $1.5 billion in appropriations for a wireless supply chain innovation fund under the Utilizing Strategic Allied Telecommunications Act, which was similarly authorized in 2021. Across these two sets of appropriations, over $40 billion are allocated for direct financial assistance in the form of competitive grants for which private companies will be able to apply. The law also authorizes over $200 billion in new programs across the federal government, paving the way for additional grants, public-private partnerships, and technology transfer opportunities.

On Episode 19 of Covington’s Inside Privacy Audiocast, Dan Cooper and and Yan Luo discuss the key provisions of China’s draft SCCs, compare the draft legislation with the GDPR, and talk through actions that companies should be considering in order to comply with the new cross-border data requirements.

This audiocast episode is repurposed from a

It was a Republican President who inaugurated America’s openness to China 50 years ago, but it is Republicans in Congress who seem poised to begin closing the door. With the likelihood of a Republican takeover of the House and possibly the Senate in November, American businesses should prepare for a raft of anti-China measures that are likely to pass the House in the new Congress.

House Republican Leadership intends to include China decoupling legislation among its top 10 priorities in 2023. Unlike many foreign policy issues on which voters express little interest, this new decoupling fervor is being driven by Republicans’ most enthusiastic voters.

In one recent unpublished poll, almost half of Republican voters agreed that the U.S. government should prohibit American companies from doing business in China, and fewer than one-third disagreed. Three times as many Republican voters strongly agreed with this view than strongly disagreed, demonstrating that voter intensity for decoupling is high.

In a time of heightened partisanship leading into another divisive election, 26 Republican Senators sent a letter supporting Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan – despite the fact that Pelosi is anathema to Republican voters. The subtext to the letter was that Republicans’ eagerness for a muscular confrontation with China trumps even election-year partisanship in some circumstances.

Policymakers and candidates of both parties have increased their focus on how technology is changing society, including by blaming platforms and other participants in the tech ecosystem for a range of social ills even while recognizing them as significant contributors to U.S. economic success globally.  Republicans and Democrats have significant interparty—and intraparty—differences in the form of their grievances and on many of the remedial measures to combat the purported harms.  Nonetheless, the growing inclination to do more on tech has apparently driven one key congressional committee to have compromised on previously intractable issues involving data privacy.  Rules around the use of algorithms and artificial intelligence, which have attracted numerous legislative proposals in recent years, may be the next area of convergence. 

While influential members of both parties have pointed to the promise and peril of the increasing role of algorithms and artificial intelligence in American life, they have tended to raise different concerns.  Legislative proposals from Democrats have frequently focused how deployment of algorithms and artificial intelligence affects protected classes, while Republican proposals have largely, but not exclusively, been aimed at perceived unfairness in how algorithms treat Republicans and those expressing conservative views.  For instance, Republican Whip John Thune (R-SD), the former chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, has sponsored the Political BIAS Emails Act (S. 4409), which would address technology companies reportedly filtering Republican campaign emails.  Meanwhile, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced the Algorithmic Accountability Act (S. 3572) that, among other things, requires that “automated decision systems” be subject to an “evaluation of any differential performance associated with consumers’ race, color, sex, gender, age, disability, religion, family status, socioeconomic status, or veteran status.”

The Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment has published a draft new law to protect Irish critical technology and infrastructure from potentially harmful non-European foreign investment.  The Screening of Third Country Transactions Bill 2022 legislatesto curb so-called “third country” (meaning non-European Union/non-European Economic Area countries) hostile actors using ownership of, or influence over businesses and assets in the Irish state to harm Ireland’s security or public order. 

First time to screen

It will be the first time Ireland has screened investment from a non-European country with a view to halting that investment if it poses such a threat.  The draft new law responds to the EU Investment Screening Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (“Regulation” – see more in Covington blogs here and here) which allows – but does not oblige – European Union Member States to screen foreign investment for risks to their security or public order.  

EU fears

The Regulation reflected a growing concern within Europe about the purchase of strategic European companies by foreign-owned firms, those concerns now heightened as a result of Covid and, more recently, by the war in Ukraine. 

The European Commission (“EC”) guided on June 22 2021, that “(s)uch transactions may put European collective security or public order at risk, especially when foreign investors are state owned or controlled, including through financing or other means of direction…while remaining open to investment, the EU is equipped to protect its essential interests.”